













The case of TUI –  
Sailing into a bright future or sinking 










Dissertation written under the supervision of  




Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the  
International MSc in Management – Entrepreneurship & Innovation, 
 at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa,  






Dissertation Title: The case of TUI – Sailing into a bright future or sinking like Thomas Cook? 
Author: Jana Christina Schäfer 
Keywords: Exogenous Shocks, Dynamic Capabilities, Strategic Change, Corporate Strategy, 
Vertical Integration, Tourism Industry, TUI 
 
In the rapidly changing environment of the tourism industry, it becomes crucial for its players 
to adapt to exogenous factors in order to stay competitive and profitable in the long run. As an 
increasing number of tourists were individually booking their holidays through online booking 
portals, the business model of pure tour operators was being undermined. While some players, 
like TUI, saw the digitalization as an opportunity to change its business model, others, like 
Thomas Cook, failed to adapt. 
 
The case of TUI, one of the largest tourism groups worldwide, serves as an example of a 
successful strategic change and fit to environmental and organizational contingencies. The case 
demonstrates how TUI transformed its business model from a traditional tour operator towards 
a fully vertically integrated provider of holiday experiences. The new management introduced 
a strategic initiative in 2013, which involved the important merger of the parent company TUI 
AG with its subsidiary TUI Travel to reach full vertical integration. Thereafter, TUI highly 
invested in assets in terms of hotels and cruise ships as well as destination experiences. It 
illustrates, that the management made use of Dynamic Capabilities and changed the company’s 
resource base through the corporate strategy of vertical integration, in particular in the form of 
taper integration.  
 
Although the strategic change had proven to be successful, the vertical integration exposed the 
group to enormous financial challenges, when the corona pandemic brought the world to a 







Título da dissertação: O caso da TUI – A navegar para um futuro brilhante ou a afundar-se 
como a Thomas Cook? 
Autor: Jana Christina Schäfer  
Palavras-chave: Choques exógenos, Dynamic Capabilities, Mudança Estratégica, Estratégia 
Corporativa, Integração Vertical, Indústria do Turismo, TUI 
 
Num ambiente em rápida mudança, como o da indústria do turismo, torna-se crucial que as 
empresas se adaptem a fatores exógenos para permanecerem competitivas e lucrativas a longo 
prazo. Com um número crescente de turistas a reservar as suas férias individualmente on-line, 
o modelo de negócios dos operadores turísticos puros foi posto em causa. Enquanto alguns 
players, como a TUI, viram a digitalização como uma oportunidade para mudar o seu modelo 
de negócios, outros, como a Thomas Cook, não conseguiram adaptar-se. 
 
O caso da TUI, um dos maiores grupos turísticos do mundo, serve como exemplo de uma 
mudança estratégica bem-sucedida e adequada às contingências ambientais e organizacionais. 
O caso demonstra como a TUI transformou o seu modelo de negócios, de uma operadora de 
turismo tradicional para um fornecedor de experiências de férias totalmente integrado 
verticalmente. A nova administração introduziu, em 2013, uma iniciativa estratégica que 
envolveu a importante fusão da empresa-mãe TUI AG com a sua subsidiária TUI Travel para 
alcançar uma integração vertical completa. Posteriormente, a TUI investiu muito em ativos, tais 
como hotéis e navios de cruzeiro, bem como em experiências nos destinos de férias. O caso 
ilustra como a gestão de topo utilizou as dynamic capabilities para mudar a base de recursos da 
empresa por meio duma estratégia corporativa de integração vertical, em particular na forma 
duma ‘taper integration’. 
 
Embora a mudança estratégica tenha sido bem-sucedida, a integração vertical expôs o grupo a 
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Package holidays Package holidays usually contain travel and accommodation sold 
together for one price, but further provisions such as catering and 
tourist services can be included. 
Tour operator “Tour operators offer holiday packages which comprise of 1. 
Travel like by rail, road or air. 2. Accommodation like hotels, 
resorts, apartments, guesthouses 3. Travel services like airport pick 
and drop, sightseeing, excursions etc. These tour operators may be 
the wholesale operators who operate tours only through retail travel 
agencies or they may be direct sell operators who market their 
product directly to the public.” (Watts & Parks, 2018) 
Travel agent “A travel agent provides information to the people on various travel 
destinations, advises them of available holiday packages to suit 
their tastes and budget and chart their travel plan. He would 
generally sell the travel associated products like currency 







Today’s world is still in shock about the recent coronavirus pandemic. The unprecedented 
health emergency did not only bring our societies and world economies to a halt. Especially the 
tourism industry fell victim to the worldwide lockdown. Tourism, until now, was on the fast 
track – for a decade, international tourism receipts have been outpacing the world’s GDP 
(UNWTO, 2019). Nevertheless, for tour operators, the competitive environment remained 
challenging due to the fierce competition of online booking portals. Competitors were forced 
out of the market, which has been recently showcased by the prominent bankruptcy case of 
Thomas Cook in 2019. At the same time, our world is still shifting from an analogue to a digital 
one with new information technologies, in which consumers increasingly search for travel-
related issues online (Tjostheim, Tussyadiah, & Oterholm Hoem, 2007). Also, people are 
striving towards a more individualistic, authentic, and self-organized way of travelling, also 
known as “New Tourism” (Poon, 1994). This development raised the question, whether the 
business model of pure tour operators was still viable in the future.  
 
Thus, in 2013, the tourism group TUI started a strategic shift from a traditional tour operator to 
an integrated provider of holiday experiences (TUI Group, 2020), as it faced these changes in 
its environment as well as several internal issues. In 2020, the new strategy was challenged by 
an exogenous shock: how can a highly vertically integrated company in the tourism sector 
address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic? 
 
The corporate strategy of vertical integration and the concept of Dynamic Capabilities (DC) 
build the foundation of argumentation for this case. Literature on DC attempts to address how 
firms should best respond to rapidly changing environments and, thus, achieve competitive 
advantage. Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) conceptualized the DC view, with (Barreto, 2010) 
further defining the concept as a firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed by 
its propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, 
and to change its resource base.  
 
The business case is designed to teach university students (1) the importance of DC in order to 
remain competitive in a rapidly changing environment (2) the impact of vertical integration on 




The first part of the dissertation will analyze the conceptual frameworks of vertical integration, 
strategic change, and DC. The teaching case will portray the tourism industry and its major 
players and challenges. Thereafter, the tourism group TUI will be presented with a look at its 
history, its transformational change, and its group portfolio. To round up the case, an outlook 
into the future covers relevant facts about the corona pandemic and future traveller trends. The 
teaching notes will assist teachers to effectively apply the case study to the course content and 
will support a well-grounded debate. Finally, the discussion connects the theoretical concepts 
to the example of TUI and provides grounds for future research and limitations of this 




2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Vertical Integration 
 
Past literature on strategic management differentiates between two types of strategies: business 
strategy and corporate strategy (Andrews & David, 1987; Ansoff, 1965).  
 
According to Grant (2016), business strategy, also known as competitive strategy, describes 
how a firm competes in its distinctive industry or market and therefore focuses on how to create 
competitive advantage with regards to a firm’s competitors.  
 
However, according to Zenger (2013), the main challenge in strategy is “not how to obtain or 
sustain competitive advantage […] but, rather, how to keep finding new, unexpected ways to 
create value”. Corporate theories can help to create cause-and-effect models, about how value 
can be created in the long-run. Corporate strategy explores the attractiveness of industries in 
which a firm can operate and aims to determine in which industries the firm competes. Hence, 
the main goal of corporate strategy is to define the scope of the firm (Grant, 2016). A firm has 
to decide, which activities should be conducted within the scope of the firm and which activities 
should be coordinated by market contracts. As synthesized by Delios and Beamish (1999), a 
firm can encompass the industry value chain in three different dimensions: 
 
(1) Vertical scope: Vertical Integration 
(2) Geographical scope: Internationalization 
(3) Product scope: Diversification 
 
Vertical integration as a corporate strategy has been regarded as a binary decision between 
‘make’ versus ‘buy’ or, in other words, ‘hierarchy’ versus ‘market’ (Kim, 2016). The old 
concept that vertical integration means either be 100 per cent integrated or not has been outdated 
though (Harrigan, 1984). The modern definition also encompasses all choices along the 
governance structure continuum between the extremes of external contracting and full internal 
integration, namely organizing forms like “spot markets, short-term contracts, long-term 





In addition, there exist several dimensions of vertical integration (Harrigan, 1984): A fully 
integrated firm satisfies all needs for a specific good in-house. A taper integrated company 
relies on both – in-house and external competences – simultaneously. A quasi-integrated firm 
does not own 100 per cent of the adjacent company in the value chain. And a nonintegrated 
company wholly relies on external contracting.  
 
Thus, vertical integration is a managerial decision about the overall firm’s scope and its 
boundaries to the external environment.  
 
Motives for vertical integration are manifold and must be assessed carefully. Internal reasons 
are economies such as minimizing transaction cost of contracting on the market, reducing 
effortful and time-consuming coordination of activities with other contracting firms, avoiding 
duplicate overhead costs as well as decreasing operating costs. Looking at competitive 
advantages, vertical integration can be a source of increased market power and thus higher entry 
barriers for potential competitors, superior access to inputs or distribution via the integration of 
complementary assets, higher product differentiation, skills, (tacit) knowledge and synergies 
created by both parties (Grant, 2016; Harrigan, 1984, 1985).  
 
Vertical integration, however, does not only come with benefits. Internal costs can arise from 
additional administrative cost of coordination, difficulties of absorbing the new company (e.g. 
incentive problems or the management of strategically different businesses), potential 
difficulties to manage excess capacities, or challenges to create and enjoy synergies. 
Competitive dangers comprise less flexibility in terms of processes, higher exit barriers once 
committed, higher dependence on adjacent business units, the loss of feedback from suppliers 
and/or distributors, and overrated synergies (Harrigan, 1984). Besides, Harrigan (1985) found 
that, if competitive conditions and demand were becoming unfavourable for the company, 
vertical integration could pressure companies to again reduce their degree of integration. Also, 
internal investment in the form of vertical integration could be harmful, if the company did not 
possess the ability to exploit synergies, if it lacked bargaining power in the market or if the 
industry was to become highly volatile.  
 
In conclusion, neither vertical integration nor strategic outsourcing has a clear-cut superiority. 
In line with this trade-off, Rothaermel, Hitt, and Jobe (2006) made a novel suggestion, that a 




integration and strategic outsourcing. The authors argue that the balanced joint effect of both, 
i.e. taper integration, can assist in optimizing the product portfolio and achieve product success. 
This, in turn, would be a source of higher competitive advantage and thereby improve firm 
performance. In their view, the ability to find the right balance of taper integration in 
consideration of a firm’s resources and competitive environment is a DC. 
 
The question remains, in which activities companies should vertically integrate to successfully 
create synergies. Argyres (1996) finds evidence that companies typically integrate into 
activities in which they have “greater production experience and/or organizational skills (i.e., 
'capabilities') than potential suppliers” and outsource when they have inferior capabilities. The 
only exception was companies wanting to explicitly develop new internal capabilities. 
Furthermore, it is more likely for companies to integrate, when the firms’ knowledge bases 
related to activities are similar and when it would take too much time to develop required 
activities in-house.  
 
2.2 Strategic Change & Strategic Fit 
 
Strategic change can be described as the “magnitude in alteration in, for example, the culture, 
or strategy, arid structure of the firm, recognizing the second order effects, or multiple 
consequences of any such changes” (Pettigrew, 1987). To reveal and implement a new direction 
in response to changing demand from the environment, it comes with “a redefinition of the 
organization’s mission and purpose or a substantial shift in overall priorities and goals” (Gioia, 
Thomas, Clark, & Chittipeddi, 1994). Those overarching changes typically imply the alteration 
of “patterns of resource allocation and/or alterations in organizational structure and processes” 
(Gioia et al., 1994). Thus, strategic change is an exhaustive shift that affects all parts of an 
organization in regards to its structure, culture, and beliefs about the organization, its 
environment, competition, and value generation (Balogun, Hope Hailey, & Gustafsson, 2016). 
In contrast to this transformational divergent change, convergent change is of incremental 
nature and merely changes existing ways of doing things within the organization (Balogun et 
al., 2016).  
 
In literature there are two schools of thought (Balogun et al., 2016): The first regards change as 




changes (Burnes, 1996; Orlikowski, 1996; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). The second assumes that 
change occurs as a process of punctuated equilibrium with rapid, revolutionary, and 
discontinuous changes at specific points in time (Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). While the latter 
model has been criticized for neglecting the “fluidity, pervasiveness, open-endedness, and 
indivisibility” (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002) of change, it may be more suitable to explain drastic, 
strategic changes when major threats or opportunities disrupt the market (Biedenbach & 
Söderholm, 2008).  
 
Changes are being implemented to achieve a better ‘fit’ of the organization’s direction with the 
conditions of its environment (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993). The concept of ‘(strategic) fit’ has been 
highly present in two kinds of literature streams: The strategy theory literature and the 
organization theory literature. In strategy, the concept of fit was defined as to match and align 
the company’s resources in a way, that it can handle environmental threats and seize 
opportunities (Andrews & David, 1987; Chandler, 1962). In the organization literature, the fit 
was described as an alignment of the internal structure of the organization and the 
environmental factors.  
 
Historically, the concept of strategic fit has been considered as a rather static one (Venkatraman, 
1989). Venkatraman (1989) also argues though, that alignment is dynamic and should be 
explored in a longitudinal perspective. More novel research shows that - due to everchanging 
external and internal situations - a dynamic view on strategic fit seems more appropriate (Zajac, 
Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000): an organization will keep striving towards strategic fit, but will never 
reach a condition of perfect alignment. In conclusion, it is crucial to understand strategic fit as 
an ongoing process. Thus, strategic change to reach strategic fit can be a complex endeavour 
with multiple dimensions and potential conflicts of objectives regarding the adaptation to 
various external shifts and inherent internal competencies, which are unique and valuable to the 
organization (Zajac et al., 2000).  
 
Recent strategic management literature suggests, that DC are necessary capabilities of a firm to 






2.3 Dynamic Capabilities 
 
One of the most significant strategic questions is how firms can obtain and sustain competitive 
advantage in the long-run (Teece et al., 1997). This question becomes even more critical in 
regimes of rapid changes and hypercompetitive environments, in which time and uncertainty 
are the main aspects of strategic considerations. In a world of fast and sometimes unexpected 
political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal changes, it is crucial for a 
firm’s survival to detect such changes, to initiate market-oriented and timely actions to face 
those structural changes, and to adapt the resource base accordingly.  
 
Precisely this capability of a firm has been coined as “Dynamic Capabilities” (DC) by Teece et 
al. (1997). In their landmark article, the authors mainly distinguish between two kinds of 
strategy models. The first kind is based on the assumption that firms build competitive 
advantage due to occupying privileged positions in the market, i.e. that rents are 
Chamberlinean. Prominent models in this category are Porter's (1980) ‘competitive forces 
approach’ and Shapiro's (1989) ‘strategic conflict approach’. The second kind assumes, that 
competitive advantage can be reached through efficiencies from within the firm, i.e. firm-level 
advantages. The ‘resource-based approach’ (Barney, 1991) surmises that rents are Ricardian, 
which means that competitive advantage is rooted in firm-specific resources and capabilities 
which are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN attributes).  
 
In the eyes of the authors, those approaches fail to understand in depth why certain firms are 
better at building competitive advantage in rapidly changing environments and thus proposed 
the DC approach to fill the gap. Zajac et al. (2000) agree on the point, that “both the industry 
and resource-based perspectives have historically tended to emphasize static equilibria”, which 
hamper the application to strategic change and rapidly changing environments in general. 
 
Teece et al. (1997) explain that DC can be understood as a strategy model that emphasizes 
efficiency, i.e. firm-specific capabilities. According to the authors, DC is an extension of the 
resource-based view, which has been criticized for failing to explain how firms can sustain 
competitive advantage in changing environments (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Priem & Butler, 




environment of ‘creative destruction’ and (disruptive) innovation. Teece et al. (1997) define 
DC as  
 
“the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments. Dynamic Capabilities thus 
reflect an organization’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive 
advantage given path dependencies and market positions”  
 
The core of the approach is to explain how firms can achieve “successive temporary advantages 
by effectively responding to successive environmental shocks” (Barreto, 2010). Due to the 
reception of great criticism and confusion towards this initial construct of DC (Danneels, 2008; 
Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Williamson, 1999; Winter, 2003) and the abundance of literature streams 
in this field, Barreto (2010) attempted to shed light on the much-discussed topic and proposed 
a new conceptualization. Barreto (2010) suggested a new definition, which converges past 
attempts of research into a four-dimension construct:  
 
“A dynamic capability is the firm’s potential to systematically solve problems, formed 
by its propensity [1] to sense opportunities and threats, [2] to make timely and [3] 
market-oriented decisions, and [4] to change its resource base.”  
 
According to Danneels (2008), the resource base can hereby be changed by reconfiguring, 
adding, and deleting resources or competences. The four dimensions highlighted in brackets 
form an aggregate concept, wherein each dimension has its right to exist and all of them have 
to be taken into consideration at the same time.  
 
As Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) suggest, these four dimensions can be understood as ‘best 
practices’ which can be duplicated across firms but are in itself an equifinal concept. Finally, 
DC indeed are important and a necessary condition to enjoy firm success, but not a sufficient 




3 Teaching Case 
 
“The maxim I have consistently pursued throughout my career has been to strengthen 
your strengths and not to waste too much time trying to improve your weaknesses.“1 
 
 – Friedrich Joussen, 13 February 2013 
 
In February 2013, Dr Michael Frenzel handed over TUI AG’s chairmanship of the executive 
board to Friedrich Joussen (Figure 1), after being in charge for 19 years. The electrical engineer 
had been the former CEO of the telecommunication company Vodafone Germany and was yet 
to discover the tourism world for himself2. His new position as CEO did not only mark the 
beginning of a new chapter in his career, but also the beginning of a new era for the tourism 
and travel group TUI. Europe’s most important tour operator, TUI Travel, sold package 
holidays to European customers, mainly from Germany and the UK.  
 
Figure 1 – New and former CEO of the TUI AG in 20133 
 
Note: Friedrich Joussen (left) and Dr. Michael Frenzel (right) 
 
To discover the tourism industry and the tour operator business, naturally, Mr Joussen decided 
to travel through the TUI world. After talking to employees, management teams, customers as 
well as investors, he concluded that many perceived the business of TUI to be susceptible to 
natural catastrophes and political crises and therefore very volatile4.  
 
Friedrich Joussen, however, broke with this prejudice and was convinced that the industry was 




the early 2010s, negatively impacted the tourism business, capacities could be adjusted flexibly. 
In this way, negative economic impacts could be limited. Regarding the economic risk, tourism 
had also proven to be rather stable. After all, tourism was an important matter for Europeans5.  
 
Despite these positive factors, the share price of the TUI AG was on a level below 10 euros 
(Figure 2), which was rather disappointing for shareholders – also with regard to the rare 
dividend payments (Exhibit 1).  
 
Figure 2 – History of TUI AG’s share price6 
 
 
The to-do-list of the new CEO was long: Mr Joussen was facing a dual structure of the German 
TUI AG and the British subsidiary TUI Travel – two different entities that were working on the 
same economic goals. In addition, TUI was still holding stakes in the unprofitable shipping 
company Hapag Lloyd, online providers were capturing the market, and growth markets in Asia 
were yet to be developed. Mr Joussen, however, was optimistic that the strong TUI brand would 
be able to deliver profitable growth in the future. Would he be able to navigate TUI through a 
strategic change and lead the company into growth? And yet, there was a major crisis to come 
in 2020. How would one of the largest tourism and travel groups survive the unprecedented 




3.1 The Tourism Industry 
 
3.1.1 Tourism around the globe 
 
Often underestimated, the tourism industry was on the fast track: in 2018, the global travel 
revenues continued to grow faster than the world’s GDP7 and almost all regions reported 
substantial growth (Figure 3). Although occasional shocks such as the global financial crisis in 
2007-08 hit the world economy as well as the tourism industry harshly, the latter had 
demonstrated resilience (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 3 – Map of international tourist arrivals and tourism receipts in 20188 
  
 





This trend in the overall tourism industry could be mainly explained by the strong economies, 
which were constantly pushing tourism expenses to higher levels. The industry was also 
favoured by an environment of increasing demand for air travel (Figure 5), improved visa 
facilitation, and technologies to improve customer’s experiences10.  
 
Figure 5 – Mode of transport in 201811 
 
 
Not only tourism on land is booming, but also tourism on the water. The cruise segment of the 
tourism industry was profiting from a steady increase of passengers (Figure 6), with around half 
of the passengers originating from North America and around one quarter from Western 
Europe, mainly Germany and the UK12.  
 






Looking at the supply side of the tourism industry, the airlines and hotels segments were the 
largest by market share (Figure 7). Travel activities, which had long been underestimated in 
their potential, reached global revenues of US$135 billion in 2016 and were expected to grow 
by 9% annually14 – outpacing the growth of other segments and the tourism industry as a whole. 
 
Figure 7 – Global travel market share by segment in 201615 
 
 
3.1.2 Exogenous shocks impacting the tourism industry in Europe  
 
In the tourism industry, demand for certain destinations was largely influenced by the general 
economic environment and external factors, such as political events, natural disasters, 
epidemics, or terrorist attacks.  
 
In this sense, the 2010s had been torn by many structural shocks. The Arab spring in 2010-12 
negatively impacted tourist arrivals in the Northern African region. In 2015, 33 TUI customers 
lost their lives in a terrorist attack in a tourist resort in Sousse, Tunisia, which was a major 
shock. TUI, however, was able to react quickly by bringing guests home and re-arranging 
holidays for those who had planned to go to Tunisia. In the same year, a plane crashed in Sharm 
el Sheik in Egypt: 
 
“Our strategic structure as an integrated tourism group has proven to be tremendously 
robust – last year [2015] especially, for all the external shocks. As we own access to 
every component in the tourism value chain and have a presence in almost every 




travel wishes.  For example, at the end of 2015 when a Kolavia plane crashed in 
Sharm-el-Sheik, within the space of 24 hours we had purchased additional bed 
capacity in Spain for 26 million euros, drawn up new flight timetables and geared our 
distribution channels to those destinations.” 16  
  
 – Friedrich Joussen, Annual Report 2016 
 
Also, numerous natural disasters rocked the world. The European heatwave in 2018 could still 
be felt by tour operators in terms of declined bookings for the following summer holidays. This 
resulted in highly competitive pressure in 2019, especially due to overcapacities of the airlines 
flying into Spain. Consequently, tour operators, like TUI, had to cut prices in order to attract 
last-minute bookings, while margins were sinking17. Those exogenous shocks could be 
cushioned by offering alternative destinations or cutting prices. 
 
Other exogenous shocks, however, could not be cushioned that well, namely the Brexit and the 
grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX.  
 
The Brexit was still daunting over Europe’s future since the referendum in June 2016. Most 
significantly, it depreciated the pound sterling and therefore lowered the Britons purchasing 
power abroad. After multiple postponements of the exit date, the UK left the EU on 31 January 
202018. Until May 2020, the two parties did not reach a trade agreement for the period after the 
transition phase, but TUI already confirmed that flights, as well as cruises, would continue to 
operate as usual19. 
 
After two fatal accidents of the aircraft Boeing 737 MAX, the model had been grounded 
worldwide in March 2019 and was expected to be grounded until at least August 2020, as 
Boeing could not fix the software issues of the aircraft20. This affected the buyers of the jet: 
TUI operated 15 MAX planes, accounting for around 10% of its fleet. In FY 2019, the company 
already had attributable costs of 293 million euros due to the replacement of the grounded 
aircraft. Additionally, the group was expecting costs of 350 to 400 million euros in FY 2020. 
In 2019, TUI stated, it could have reached consistent earning as to the prior year if it was not 
for the MAX grounding, but instead the EBITA went down by 26%21.  
 
The tourism business, however, had never been challenged as much as by the coronavirus 
pandemic in 2019-20. Local crises, overcapacities, or shortages were manageable, but the 




3.1.3 Competitive Environment 
 
In 2018, the TUI Group was by far the largest tour operator in the European market (Figure 8).   
 
Figure 8 – Turnover of major tour operators in Europe (FY 2018)22 
 
 
These tour operators were selling their tourism services offline, via travel agencies, as well as 
online, via booking websites and mobile applications. Among German travellers, online 
booking methods were increasing steadily23, although offline methods were still used (Figure 
9, Figure 10). 
 





Figure 10 – Internet travel agencies in Germany25 
  
 
Once tourists made their bookings, the time until the start of vacation could be used to sell travel 
activities. The supply of the market was highly fragmented, though: more than 90% of the 
350,000 providers were small businesses26. Besides, the segment was yet relatively non-digital: 
as of 2017, more than 80% of the gross bookings were made offline. However, the steep growth 
of the things-to-do market and the shift from manual to digital bookings attracted a vibrant 
startup scene, traditional travel agencies, and major digital players to enter the market (Figure 
11, Table 1). 
 
Figure 11 – Relevant players in the global travel activities marketplace27 
 
 
Table 1 – Major acquisitions in the travel activities market28  
 
Acquirer Target company Date 
Tripadvisor Viator 2014 
TUI Musement 2018 





3.1.4 Thomas Cook bankruptcy 
 
A major event for the tour operator market was in late September 2019, when Thomas Cook 
declared bankruptcy after being in business for 178 years. The insolvency led to a broader 
market consolidation of the tour operator market, from which TUI could benefit immensely: 
Thomas Cook left behind a hole of 1.4% of all European short-haul seats as well as market 
shares at important European airports29. TUI and competitors reacted quickly by incorporating 
Thomas Cook’s hotels in their programmes30. 
 
Reasons for the business failure of the world’s oldest travel company were manifold. One of 
the main reasons was the merger with MyTravel in 2007 – a travel group that had only made 
profits once in six years prior to the merger31 – which was planned to improve the digital 
portfolio of the group but instead piled up more debts. Thomas Cook was unable to take on the 
challenge of the emerging internet rivals: a former executive at MyTravel stated, that “Thomas 
Cook had an analogue business model in a digital world”32. Also, he said, much of the company 
value was to be found in the goodwill of the company, which relied on the brand strength and 
the loyalty of its customers33. Thomas Cook owned very little tangible assets, like hotels or 
planes (Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3), and suffered when customers left to book their holidays 
themselves or with online competitors. Other management problems worsened the situation and 
restructuring plans were chaotic34.  
 
All in all, the bankruptcy of Thomas Cook was a warning sign for all tour operators in the 
market. As Mr Joussen stated, TUI could “no longer [risk to be] the penultimate dinosaur, but 





3.2 The TUI Group 
 
3.2.1 History of TUI until 2013 
 
“A general store learns to smile - Preussag becomes TUI” 36 
 
– Stern, 19 June 2002 
 
The TUI Group started as a business that could not be more different from the one it was known 
for by the end of 2019. In fact, the company underwent a drastic change from the mining and 
heavy industry towards the tourism industry, which to this extent was nearly unprecedented by 
other German companies of similar sizes37. The state-owned ‘Preussag’, short for ‘Prussian 
Mining and Smelting Company’, has been founded in 192338. After the Second World War, 
Preussag decided to enrichen its portfolio by various kinds of consumer goods. When Michael 
Frenzel took over the management in 1994, the enterprise started to take the pivotal shift into 
the tourism industry, mostly by the strategic acquisition of Hapag-Lloyd AG in 199739. It was 
one of the leading German tourism providers with its air fleet, cruise ships, and chain of travel 
agencies. It also owned a 30 per cent share in the largest European travel company, Touristik 
Union International GmbH & Co, in short TUI, based in Hanover40.  
 
When the group bought prominent tourism companies such as the British ‘Thomson Travel 
Group’, it finally became one of the world’s largest tourism groups41. In 2002, the parent 
company Preussag was renamed to TUI AG, which marked the definite farewell from the 
commodity industry and the final repositioning as a service provider for holidays and logistics. 
The TUI AG was the parent company of TUI Group, which subsumed all tourism investments 
and brands. 
 
A landmark year was 2007, in which the tourism division of the TUI AG merged with the 
British ‘First Choice Holidays PLC’42 (Figure 12), which was renowned in the package travel 
segment. Since TUI AG did not possess enough financial means to fully take over First Choice, 





Figure 12 – Merger of TUI AG’s tourism division with First Choice Holidays PLC44 
 
 
All tour operator activities – and thus by far the largest portion of the business – were carried 
out in the UK, while the holding company in Germany retained the group-owned hotel and 
cruise business along with the loss-making container shipping company Hapag-Lloyd and other 
smaller businesses45 (Figure 13). In 2014, around 15% of TUI’s content had been provided by 
its own brands. 
 





At this point, the new group managed around 48,000 employees, 101 tour operator brands, more 
than 3500 travel agencies, and seven airlines with more than 150 aircraft.  
 
In 2008, the TUI AG and the Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., one of the global leaders in the 
cruise ship market, started the joint venture TUI Cruises, to bring a premium cruise product to 
the German market. A year later, TUI decided to sell shares of the container shipping company 
Hapag-Lloyd AG. The cruise division of Hapag-Lloyd AG, however, remained within the 
group. Thus, the group bowed out of the shipping industry in the following years and turned 
into a pure tourism group with three main divisions:  
 
(1) TUI Travel: Tour operator, airlines, distribution and incoming 
(2) TUI Hotels & Resorts 
(3) TUI Cruise Holidays: Hapag-Lloyd Cruises, TUI Cruises, Thomson Cruises 
 
After a failed merger attempt of TUI AG and TUI Travel, the TUI AG as a parent company 
remained troubled with a complicated group structure, and remaining Hapag-Lloyd shares were 
contributing to losses. Friedrich Joussen became the new CEO of the TUI AG in February 2013 
and was optimistic to steer the company into a brighter future. 
 
3.2.2 Strategic initiative ‘oneTUI’ 
 
“After just 100 days, I announced that this financial year would be a year of transition. 
It is also a year in which we will leave no stone unturned and then have special effects 
as a result of write-downs. This approach is necessary. We are now making a clean 
sweep and will then turn our focus to the future.”47 
 
–  Friedrich Joussen, Annual Report 2013 
 
Friedrich Joussen initiated a wave of structural changes during his incumbency. The first one 
was subsumed under the name ‘oneTUI’ (Exhibit 4). The changes were initiated in May 2013 
and were planned to be accomplished by 2016. While the first phase of the initiative in 2013 
and 2014 focused on cutting costs, increasing efficiencies in underperforming business areas, 







Creating a lean corporate centre 
 
Due to high costs and interest payments at the headquarter of the TUI AG, the parent company 
was making huge losses, which led to a loss of investor’s trust towards TUI AG48. Thus, Mr 
Joussen decided to cut costs in the headquarters, for example through a staff reduction from 
200 to 90 employees as of summer 2014, the cancellation of all sport sponsorship deals, and 
the sale of the corporate jet49. In addition, the debt had been restructured in order to lower the 
interest burden.   
 
Solving the problematic dual structure of TUI AG and TUI Travel 
 
Since the merger in 2007, the duality had continued to be a structural problem, hindering and 
slowing down decision making, since every decision of the holding firm, TUI AG, had to be 
discussed with the subsidiary management of TUI Travel, which managed most of the operating 
activities50. Due to the first phase of the oneTUI initiative, financial capabilities were available 
to finally merge the dual structure of the tour operator on the one side (TUI Travel) and the 
‘content’, i.e. hotels and cruises, on the other side (TUI AG) into one and thereby cutting 
overlapping functions51 (Table 2). On 15 September 2014, TUI AG and TUI Travel had agreed 
on the merger terms and the 6.5-billion-euro merger was completed by the end of 2014 – 
thereby creating the world’s largest leisure tourism group52. 
 
Table 2 – Synergies versus costs of the TUI Travel & TUI AG merger53 
 
 
The TUI Group, under which name the new TUI was operating, was more agile, leaner, and 
better equipped to manoeuvre into the future. Thanks to the merger, TUI AG was able to cover 




“We will broaden our unique holiday portfolio which is a strategic advantage for the 
tour operator. The differentiated hotel portfolio has always been cornerstone of the 
strategy and we can broaden that. […] We can actually guarantee occupancy levels 
much more easily when we run an integrated business. The last advantage is we will 
change our yield management so we behave more like hotels.” 54 
  
 – Friedrich Joussen, CEO of TUI AG 
 
“We are taking the best of both businesses to create a stronger business with long term 
sustainability and you have de-risked growth. […] As you grow your hotels portfolio 
if you have your own distribution channel you are de-risking and that enables us to 
strengthen our position. […] It’s working and strengthening us against many 
competitors round the world that we compete with. We see more growth.” 55 
 
 – Peter Long, CEO of TUI Travel 
 
Eventually, the merger carried more power for Friedrich Joussen and resulted in the resignation 
of Peter Long as TUI Travel’s chief executive, who became chairman of the supervisory board 




In FY 2015, six functions of the TUI Group were centralized to be managed at the group 
headquarters, among them the content management of hotels, cruises, and destination 
experiences as well as the brand, IT, and airline management. Through an alliance of all airlines, 
the group was able to create cost advantages, for example through a higher purchasing power 
towards the supplier Boeing, a one-stop-shop for maintenance and ground handling, and the 
simplified exchange of aircraft between airlines. The planning of flights as well as the crew 
management remained a local responsibility of each airline. 
 
Optimizing the portfolio: Think Travel. Think TUI.  
 
The TUI Group had been launching a strategic realignment to focus on its core business: ‘Pure 
Tourism’57 (Exhibit 5, Exhibit 6). The overall goal was to transform the business model from 
a dependence on the traditional tour operation towards content and brand-driven value 





Mr Joussen systematically reviewed all activities in terms of their affiliation to the core 
business. For example, every hotel had been analyzed, whereupon some parted the company, 
and some were repositioned. At the same time, TUI divested in business areas, which did not 
generate synergies and did not belong to the core business (Table 3). 
 
Table 3 – Non-core business disposal program59 
 
 
Following this strategy, TUI reinvested the disposal proceeds in its transformational growth of 
hotels, cruises, and destination experiences.  
 
Developing the brand: oneBrand initiative 
 
There was an abundance of brands, which turned out to be difficult to differentiate by 
consumers60. To create less confusion around the brand portfolio, the oneBrand initiative had 
been launched (Figure 14): aside from Germany, Poland, Switzerland, and Austria, where the 
business had always operated under the name TUI, other countries were planned to migrate to 





Figure 14 – Development of the oneBrand initiative launched in 201561 
 
 
The rebranding initiative was aiming to harmonize the brand appearance and to create visibility 
along the whole value chain – to portray TUI as one big, international, consistent power brand 
with local roots62. This had to be conducted offline, for example by rebranding planes, buses, 
group activities and publications or posters and banners in holiday destinations, as well as 
online, for example through introducing a centralized URL, search engine optimization, and 
online advertising campaigns63.  
 
In line with the oneBrand initiative, in 2016, TUI introduced the first in-house developed hotel 
chain to feature “TUI” in its name: the life-style brand TUI Blue. This new brand was meant to 
address modern, culturally interested guests with a special focus on authenticity by offering 
regional cuisine, traditional architectural styles of the hotels and excursions off the beaten 
tracks. Individuality was guaranteed by a multi-lingual app as a digital service assistant, through 












Digitalizing the business 
 
The digitalization of the business model was also on the agenda (Figure 15). The “TUI App” 
was launched in FY 2016 and was planned to become TUI’s biggest digital sales channel. 
 
Figure 15 – Digitalization roadmap as of 8 December 201664 
 
 
A newly setup Mobility Hub in London in 2014 was also working on other ways of digitalizing 
the customer experience, for example by testing the ‘TUI Smartband’ – a waterproof wearable 
which could be used to access the resort, to make purchases through the digital wallet and to 
smartly control the guest’s room features65.  
 
Beyond that, the group was planning to absorb the customers’ willingness to pay for higher 
quality through online differentiation and personalization. For example, TUI was aiming at 
exploiting the higher willingness to pay of customers for a specific room through its ‘Select 






3.2.3 Group Portfolio as of 2020 
 
“We deliver the full customer experience, from inspiration and booking, through the 
travel journey, to the experience in the destination.”67 
 
– Annual Report 2019 
 
The TUI Group’s portfolio was comprised of the two main businesses ‘Holiday Experiences’ 
and ‘Markets & Airlines’, as well as the remaining ‘All other segments’ (Figure 16, Exhibit 8). 
 
Figure 16 – TUI Group structure as of 30 September 201968 
 
 
Those two main businesses were clustered into five business units69:  
 
(1) TUI Hotels & Resorts 
(2) Cruises 
(3) TUI Destination Experiences 
(4) Sales & Marketing 
(5) Airlines  
 
Since summer 2018, the business units Sales & Marketing and Airlines have been combined 
into the Markets & Airlines business to use the synergies of the tour operator business in the 
source markets and the airline management. The five business units were the foundation of the 
fully integrated business model of TUI and enabled to cover the whole holiday customer 
journey (Figure 17), which was one of the main differentiating factors towards competitors, 




Figure 17 – End-to-end customer experience of TUI70 
 
 
After the oneTUI transformation, TUI was a product-focused holiday provider, which could 
leverage its vertical integration (Figure 18, Exhibit 10).  
 







3.2.3.1 TUI Hotels & Resorts 
 
In 2020, the Hotels & Resorts portfolio of the group included its six top brands (Figure 19, 
Exhibit 11): Robinson, TUI Magic Life, TUI Suneo, TUI Blue, TUI Sensatori and Riu, the 49% 
joint venture.  
 
Figure 19 – TUI’s leading leisure hotel brands72 
 
 
At the end of FY 2019, the total number of hotels amounted to 411, which included the top 
brands of TUI as well as worldwide partnerships with numerous other hotel chains (Figure 20). 
 





All in all, the Hotel & Resorts segment was not only the largest contributor to the adjusted 
EBITA of the group in 2018 and 2019 (Figure 21, Exhibit 12) but also the core holiday element 
for the customer. TUI’s main belief was that the accommodation was one of the main decision 
factors for a tourist’s booking and drove customer loyalty74.  
 
Figure 21 – Underlying EBITA by segment of FY 2018 and FY 201975 
 
 
For this reason, the TUI Group had been striving for the growth of its portfolio in this segment 
(Table 4). In total, TUI operated its hotels under 6 different contract types (Figure 22). As a 
guideline for investment, the growth roadmap for hotels stated, that ownership and joint venture 
models were to be fostered in high growth regions with scarce supply, and other hotel 





Table 4 – Count of hotels by financing structure77 
 
Note: Third-party concept hotels included TUI Sensatori, TUI Sensimar, TUI Family Life 
 
Figure 22 – TUI Hotels & Resorts’ portfolio contract type as of 201978 
 
 
The hotels and resorts were mostly located at or near beaches (Figure 23). Especially, long-haul 
destinations were becoming increasingly important, as 365 days of sunshine promised high 
returns on investment79 (Figure 24). After 2016, around three-quarters of the capital 


















Ownership and Joint Venture 95 98 112 115 127 132 145 
Other financing structures 137 140 198 188 200 198 209 
Management 116 119 143 133 147 148 163 
Lease 14 12 46 46 43 43 42 
Franchise 7 9 9 9 10 7 4 
TUI concept hotels run by 
third-party hoteliers 
(commercial cooperation) 
n/a n/a n/a 45 53 50 57 





Figure 23 – Hotels & Resorts' regions as of 30 September 201981 
 
 
Figure 24 – Map of existing hotels by regions and regions of growth82  
 
 
In particular, TUI’s new flagship brand TUI Blue (Exhibit 13) was receiving higher attention 
and was planned to become the world’s largest and internationally known holiday hotel brand. 
Two existent hotel brands (TUI Sensimar, TUI Family life) had been rebranded into TUI Blue 
hotels and the portfolio was planned to be augmented from around 10 hotels in March 2019 to 
around 100 hotels in 202083. The expansion was intended to be mainly driven by repositioning 
existing hotels and by asset-light financing structures, i.e. management, franchise, or third-party 






At the end of 2019, TUI comprised 18 vessels consisting of three brands: TUI Cruises, Marella 
Cruises (formerly: Thomson Cruises), and Hapag-Lloyd Cruises85. TUI Cruises, the 50/50 joint 
venture with the worldwide market leader in the cruise business – Royal Caribbean Cruises – 
was operating in the German-speaking premium volume market. Marella Cruises served mainly 
the British family and city cruise market and Hapag-Lloyd Cruises were operating in the luxury 
and expedition market. The TUI Group was heavily investing in the cruise ship market since it 
was expecting growth in this market (Exhibit 14, Exhibit 15). Heavy investment went into 
buying cruise ships from former lessors in all three cruise brands (Table 5). Especially the 
capacities for the joint venture TUI Cruises, the main investment vehicle of TUI, was expanded 
through the acquisition and commission of cruise ships. 
 
Table 5 – Cruise fleet by ownership structure from 2016 until 201986 
 
Note: All numbers refer to 30 September of the stated year. 
 
In February 2020, TUI sold the expedition and luxury cruise subsidiary Hapag-Lloyd Cruises 
to the joint venture TUI Cruises. The value of the transaction was estimated at 1.2 billion euros 
without net debt and resulted in a net cash inflow of approximately 700 million euros. Mr 
Joussen stated, that this was the next logical step in order to push the growth of the cruise 
segment faster and less capital intensive. Royal Caribbean Cruises facilitated access to new 
international customer groups and the financing of new ships. There were no layoffs planned 
in the course of the company restructuring of the brand and the proceeds were planned to be 
further invested in the digitalization of the business87. 
 
Cruise Brand 
Owned Finance Lease Operating Lease Total 
2016 2017 2018 2019 2016 2017 2018 2019 2016 2017 2018 2019 2016 2017 2018 2019 
TUI Cruises 
(JV) 




- 1 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 - 5 6 6 6 
Hapag-Lloyd 
Cruises 





3.2.3.3 TUI Destination Experiences 
 
Besides the Hotels & Resorts and Cruise business, the third growth sector for TUI was the 
Destination Experiences. Several months would usually pass between booking and start of the 
vacation and so TUI identified its opportunity to offer customized destination experiences in 
the meantime. 
 
There were three main brands under the umbrella of the Spanish subsidiary TUI Destination 
Experiences: Intercruises, Pacific World, and Musement, one of the leading online providers in 
the activities market (Table 6).  
 
Table 6 – TUI Destination Experiences brands88 
 
Aside from cruise handling and event management, the offer of TUI was including all services 
for a destination, that a guest could imagine: excursions, activities (wellness, sports, culture, 
guided tours, etc.), round trips, guest care and transfers. The tours and activties platform 
Musement was designed as a two-sided open platform, which offered not only its own products 
but also experiences from distribution partners and third parties to its own customers as well as 
external customers. After the strategic acquisition of Musement in 2018, the bookings had 
doubled within 3 months already and promised more growth89. It offered a range of 150,000 
activities, of which 50,000 were curated by TUI. To eventually reach its vision of ‘1 million 
Brand Description 
 “Intercruises looks after cruises for all the world's major cruise 
companies in around 60 countries. With a market share of 14 
percent, the company is one of the leading providers in its 
segment.” 
 “Pacific World is active in the conference and events business. 
The company offers its services in 30 countries worldwide – 
preferably in Asia – and accompanied over 1 million events last 
year.” 
 “Five years after its foundation [in 2013], Musement is one of 
the leading online providers in the tours and activities market. 
The Italian start-up offers travellers activities and excursions in 





things to do’, TUI had started, for instance, a cooperation with Ctrip in March 2019 - the leading 
Chinese online provider for tours and activities90. It allowed Ctrip’s 200 million mostly Chinese 
customers to have direct access to Musement’s offers.  
 
In contrast to other online providers of activities, like Tripadvisor, TUI may have entered the 
market a bit late, but it could compensate with a clear advantage, Mr Joussen stated: TUI was 
the only provider represented locally with its own employees – a total of 10,000 in 50 countries 
– to ensure safety and quality of the excursions91. The company not only promised high quality 
and individual offers, but also high reachability, be it through the TUI Contact Centre, the travel 
agency, the Rep on-site, the website, or the app.  
 
3.2.3.4 Sales & Marketing 
 
The segment of Sales & Marketing comprised the tour operator and travel agency businesses.  
The travel agencies comprised around 1,600 group-owned agencies, 1,200 franchise partners, 
and around 15,000 independent points of sale in Europe92. Via those retail channels as well as 
online channels, TUI sold holiday packages to its 21 million customers (Figure 25). This 
business, in turn, ensured occupancy in its own hotels and cruises and the use of destination 
experience offers.  
 
Figure 25 – Distribution mix of the TUI Group93 
 




The segment was clustered into three core regions: the Northern Region, the Central Region, 
and the Western Region (Figure 26).  
 
Figure 26 – Map of TUI’s main source markets94 
 
 
While the main source markets were located in Europe, TUI was aiming to further attract 
customers from new source markets (Table 7).  
 
Table 7 – TUI’s source markets95 
 
To draw customers from those six new markets, TUI had launched the ‘Global Distribution 
Network – Online Travel Agent’ (GDN-OTA) platform in 2019. The new platform offered 
mainly ‘accommodation only’ instead of package holidays96. TUI’s vision for this platform was 
Major source markets New source markets (GDN-OTA) 
Country Customers in million FY19 Country 








The Netherlands & Belgium 5 
Sweden, Norway, Finland & Denmark 1 
France 1 
Poland 1 
Switzerland 0.2  





to become the leading meta-search engine for hotels, including independent third-party hotels, 
as a “holistic digital hotel service provider”97. TUI declared, that it was willing to push this 
platform through competitive pricing and simultaneously accepted little or no profitability. Its 
main aim was to engage as many customers as possible in the TUI ecosystem, from where TUI 
could cross- and upsell more products and offers. In 2019, the platform had 250,000 customers 
from the new markets98. Other than in the traditional sourcing markets of TUI, the group did 
not intend to build up a dense network of offline travel agencies but purely relied on online 
presence and strong local partnerships99. In the future, TUI planned to not only offer 
accommodation but also flights (sourced from other airlines), transfers as well as activities100.  
 
In addition, a new ‘Property Management System’, which relied on blockchain technology, 
enabled hoteliers to sell their hotel beds in a more differentiated way: the customer could book 
a specific room of choice based on, for example, morning or evening sun, with garden or sea 
view, or rooms with guaranteed baby phone range, for an additional charge of 5-10 euros per 
room per night101. This new system, which had been initially developed for group-owned hotels, 
was adopted by 30% of the customers already and enabled to lead to higher margins102. 
 
Although the GDN-OTA platform was directly competing with market leaders, such as 
Booking.com, TUI justified its market entrance by offering more freedom to hoteliers and more 
options for individualization with the new Property Management System103. Overall, the 
occupancy risk of TUI’s hotels was to be reduced by appealing to a more diverse and 




According to the main source markets in Europe, TUI’s airlines included a fleet of around 150 
aircraft of the following five airlines in FY 2019: 
 
(1) TUI Airways (Great Britain & Ireland) 
(2) TUI fly Belgium 
(3) TUI fly Germany 
(4) TUI fly Netherlands 




In line with the growing hotel, cruise and destination experience portfolio, TUI expanded its 
aircraft portfolio to be able to fly its customers to the holiday destinations (Fehler! Ungültiger 
Eigenverweis auf Textmarke.).  
 
Table 8 – Aircraft assets by financing structure in million euros104 
 
Note: *According to IASB rules, TUI AG was not the economic owner of these assets 
 
The main differentiator towards other leisure airlines was the Boeing B787  Dreamliner, which 
was operated on long-haul flights. Due to its high-quality experience for customers and fuel 
efficiencies compared to similar-sized aircraft, the fleet was planned to be extended by this 
aircraft type – to serve the increasing long-haul destination portfolio. To further extent its fleet, 
TUI had ordered 72 aircraft of the (problematic) Boeing 737 MAX until 2023105. While Boeing 
had already reached agreements with American airlines on compensation payments due to the 
flight ban of the 737 Max, such results have been delayed in Germany106.  














Ownership and finance lease 491.5 635.7 1,166.0 1,202.0 1,207.2 1,415.2 1,592.6 





3.3 Looking into the future 
 
3.3.1 COVID-19 pandemic 
 
“There is no reason and no indication to believe that demand for travel will decline – 
on the contrary.” 107 
 
 – Friedrich Joussen, Annual Report 2018 
 
At the beginning of 2020, the world was facing an unprecedented global health emergency: the 
outbreak of the coronavirus. The COVID-19 pandemic had brought the world to a standstill and 
impacted not only our daily lives but also our livelihoods and societies as a whole. While every 
country in the world was affected and attempted to curb the pandemic, the economies were 
suffering during the politically imposed containment measures due to a heavy reduction of 
economic activity and travel restrictions (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27 – Type of COVID-19 travel restrictions by destination as of May 2020108 
 
 
The tourism industry, in particular, had been negatively affected by the crisis: 
 
 “In many otherwise popular tourist destinations, hotels have been deserted and 
restaurants, bars, tourist attractions, theme parks and museums closed. […] Major 
cruise companies have halted operations; cruise ships have been stranded at sea, as 
more and more ports have temporarily refused them entry. Many countries have 
reintroduced border controls or banned certain travelers from entering their territory, 
leaving them struggling to return home.”109 
 




Worldwide, around 100 million people were predicted to lose their job in the travel and tourism 
industry, including 13 million jobs in the EU110. In total, the EU tourism industry was losing 
around 1 billion euros in revenue per month. As of spring 2020, it was still extremely difficult 
to estimate the consequences of COVID-19 on international tourism. However, the UNWTO 
attempted to put forward some estimates (Figure 28). Its calculations of a 20-30% decline in 
international tourism would translate into a loss of 300-400$ billion loss in tourism receipts, 
which was around one-third of international tourism receipts worldwide111. 
 
Figure 28 – 2020 forecast of worldwide international tourist arrivals112  
 
 
Especially the air transport had been harshly impacted. It was estimated a worldwide reduction 
of revenue passenger kilometre (RPK) of 38% compared to 2019 and a passenger revenue 
decrease of 252 billion dollars113. Until June 2020, 2 million passenger flights had been 
cancelled and airlines were struggling due to low liquidity. In March 2020, the corona crisis 
claimed its first victim: the airline Flybe was forced to cease operations114.  
 
Although the tourism sector had shown strength and resilience towards crises like the SARS 
outbreak in 2003 in the Asia Pacific or the global economic crisis in 2008-09, the COVID-19 
pandemic seemed to have a much heavier impact on the tourism industry due to its far-reaching 
travel restrictions. In Germany, for example, the government extended the worldwide travel 






Figure 29 – Holiday plans of Germans as of April 2020115 
 
 
A vast majority of TUI’s travel operation was suspended on 15 March 2020116 and, until 
amelioration of the corona situation was in sight, all cruise ships returned to the port of 
Hamburg and aeroplanes were parked. TUI fly as well as Lufthansa and Condor participated in 
the German repatriation program of stranded tourists and made aircraft available, which were 
chartered by the German government117. As for the bookings already made, the group stated 
that customers’ trips could be postponed free of charge and that payments were sufficiently 
secured118. As of April 2020, the crisis management team of TUI had put together a task force, 
which was handling the restart of the business activities as soon as it was safe to travel again119. 
However, TUI withdrew its guidance for FY 2020 and stated to have cash and available 
facilities of 1.4 billion euros to mitigate the impact of the coronavirus120. In addition, after prior 
approval of the German Federal Government, TUI signed a state aid bridging loan of 1.8 billion 
euros in April 2020121. TUI announced that from April until September employees would 
reduce work hours and would get wage subsidies from the German state122. Despite obtaining 
a state loan, Mr Joussen announced that every ninth job, and thus up to 8,000 employees, were 
to be laid off123. Criticism rose as the main beneficiaries of the loan were TUI AG’s wealthy 
foreign shareholders. Alarmingly, the sum of the loan was so high that the German state could 







3.3.2 Future Travelers 
 
Whether the corona crisis was about to have a long-lasting impact on the future traveller 
behaviour, was yet unclear. Especially the cruise segment had been negatively impacted by the 
large media coverage of failed quarantine on some cruise ships125. Experts stated, however, that 
travelling had become a normal part of life in many societies, especially in Europe, and people 
would go on holidays again once it was safe and budget permitted126. It was yet too early to 
understand if the corona crisis could lead to a shift away from mass tourism, but trends such as 
quality-oriented tourism and sustainability were pursued despite the corona crisis127.  
 
In the mid-term future until 2030, overall global trends were expected to shape the future of the 
tourism industry. The global population was projected to rise from 7.7 billion in 2019128 to 8.5 
billion in 2030129. While developing countries were projected to increase in population, 
developed countries’ populations were on the decrease. The markets of the Pacific Asia region, 
Latin America and Africa were growing – shifting the global power to the south-east130. In 
general, more people around the globe would be able to afford holidays due to more economic 
activities in these regions.  
 
According to the World Tourism Organization, six different consumer travel trends were 
apparent as of 2019 (Figure 30). 
 





In summer 2018, the 15-year-old Greta Thunberg started the Fridays for Future movement, 
which shortly after became viral on social media, spread to European countries, and finally all 
over the world. Millions of students peacefully protested every Friday against the governments’ 
lack of action on the climate crisis. Thus, one of the main keywords for the 2020s and tourism 
would remain sustainability. The Sustainable Development Goals formulated by the UN would 
continue to shape the decisions of companies, governments, international organizations as well 
as consumers. In 2019, 68% of the German population considered environmental and climate 
protection to be the most important societal challenge and to be crucial to master future tasks, 
to ensure prosperity and competitiveness and to create jobs132. Awareness about the individual 
carbon footprint was increasing through environmental movements and, in 2020, around half 
of the global travellers were willing to travel with a slower mode of transport to reduce their 
negative impact on the environment133.  
 
At the same time, ongoing digitalization would create an abundance of information. Inventive 
tech inspiration and recommendations could help travellers to choose from the abundance of 
places to visit and excursions to do. For 2020, almost half of the travellers worldwide revealed 
their willingness to use an app as an efficient and easy way to get inspired, to book activities 
while travelling, or to pre-plan activities. Thus, it was expected that more apps integrating 
Artificial Intelligence would be developed, which could offer tailored recommendations 
according to the taste, previous experiences, and other factors like the weather and popularity 
of attractions134.  
 
3.3.3 TUI’s future outlook 
 
“From an integrated holiday provider to an integrated digital tourism ecosystem”135 
 
– Annual Report 2019 
 
Since 2017, the new strategic initiative ‘TUI 2022’ focused on transforming TUI from a 
product-centric to a platform-centric company, mainly through digitalization. The overall goal 
was to gain an additional 1 million customers in the new markets and an additional 1 billion 
euros turnover in five years136.  
 
Although January 2020 started off being by far the best booking month in company history137, 




The coronavirus pandemic did not only bring the tourism industry to a halt but also reinforced 
concerns about the future risk situation of the company. According to CEO Mr Joussen, TUI 
took two steps to deal with the corona pandemic: ensure liquidity and cut costs. The former 
could be attained through the state loan, the latter through short-time work, and the reduction 
of fixed costs by 70% through efficient cost management. He also confirmed that future seasons 
were very well booked: for the summer holiday season 2021, bookings were already double as 
high as expected by May 2020. TUI’s website was also advertising the summer holidays 2021 
in particular. Also, a 10-step plan had been written to ensure hygiene standards in hotels and 
safe travelling for customers. Ultimately, he stated, people wanted to go on holidays – but it 
had to be made safe138.  
 
At the end of May 2020, the rating agency Moody’s downgraded the corporate rating of the 
TUI AG, which then reached a level of ‘substantial risk’ (Figure 31). Even before the corona 
crisis in December 2019, Moody's had downgraded the credit rating to ‘speculative’ because 
the necessary investments no longer appeared to be covered by the operating cash flow (Exhibit 
16)139. 
 
Figure 31 – TUI AG’s corporate ratings as of May 2020140 
 
 
Those dooming outlooks rose existential fears for the group and put high pressure on CEO Mr 
Joussen: would the strategy realignment initiated by him pave the way into a bright future or 








Exhibit 1 – Dividend payments of TUI AG141 
 
Year Dividend yield in % Dividend 
2019 5,06 0,54 
2018 4,34 0,72 
2017 4,50 0,65 
2016 4,98 0,63 
2015 3,43 0,56 
2014 2,79 0,33 
2013 1,59 0,15 
2012 0,00 0,00 
2011 0,00 0,00 
2010 0,00 0,00 
2009 0,00 0,00 
2008 0,00 0,00 
2007 1,31 0,25 
2006 0,00 0,00 
2005 4,45 0,77 
2004 4,42 0,77 
2003 4,66 0,77 
2002 4,76 0,77 
2001 2,79 0,77 





Exhibit 2 – Development of Thomas Cook’s asset structure142 
 
 






2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Fiscal Year Ends 30.09.2014 30.09.2015 30.09.2016 30.09.2017 30.09.2018
Intangible 2,873.00 2,794.00 3,077.00 3,136.00 3,104.00
Tangible 755.00 807.00 848.00 720.00 718.00
Investments 15.00 5.00 9.00 7.00 86.00
Other 322.00 317.00 364.00 511.00 548.00
Total 3,965.00 3,923.00 4,298.00 4,374.00 4,456.00
Stock 34.00 32.00 43.00 42.00 44.00
Debtors 301.00 252.00 320.00 311.00 399.00
Cash and 
Securities
962.00 1,276.00 1,754.00 1,379.00 1,001.00
Total 1,829.00 2,035.00 2,645.00 2,231.00 2,113.00
Held for 
Disposal
- - - - -
Total Assets
5,794.00 5,958.00 6,943.00 6,605.00 6,569.00




2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Fiscal Year Ends 30.09.2015 30.09.2016 30.09.2017 30.09.2018 30.09.2019
Intangible 4,131.90 3,399.30 3,437.60 3,556.30 3,696.40
Tangible 3,636.80 3,714.50 4,253.70 4,876.30 5,840.40
Investments 1,134.00 1,231.20 1,343.40 1,452.40 1,550.60
Other 711.30 786.80 802.90 765.80 870.00
Total 9,614.00 9,131.80 9,837.60 10,650.80 11,957.40
Stock 134.50 105.20 110.20 118.50 114.70
Debtors 754.70 708.60 700.90 821.90 876.50
Cash and 
Securities
2,007.60 2,338.70 2,528.00 2,367.50 1,490.50





14,086.50 14,457.90 14,166.00 15,590.80 16,270.90




































Exhibit 6 – Development of TUI’s structure145 
 














Exhibit 7 – Change of main markets for TUI146 
 
 
Exhibit 8 – Fact Sheet of TUI AG for FY 2019147 
 
Main Market Environments and 
Competition in FY 2012/13 
Main Market Environments and 
Competition in FY 2018/19 
Tour operator travel market Hotel Market 
Market for business and holiday hotels Cruise Market 
Cruises Destination Experiences 
 
Fact Sheet of TUI AG  
Foundation 9 October 1923 
Headquarter  Hannover, Germany 
Employees 71,473 
Turnover ~ € 18.9 billion 
Net profit € 531.9 million 
Market capitalization € 6.3 billion 
Reporting period 1 October – 30 September 
Customers ~21 million (in the Markets & Airlines businesses) 
Aircraft  ~150 
Hotels 411 
Cruise ships 18 (as at December 2019) 





Exhibit 9 – TUI and selected competitors regarding the customer’s journey in 2015148 
 
 




































Exhibit 14 – Overview of the active and planned cruise fleet as of 2020152 
 



















Mein Schiff 1 1,924 1996 May 2009 
Since 2018: Marella 
Explorer 
Mein Schiff 2  1,912 1997 May 2011 
Since 2019: Mein 
Schiff  
Mein Schiff 3 2,506 2014 June 2014 Active 
Mein Schiff 4  2,506 2015 June 2015 Active 
Mein Schiff 5  2,534 2016 July 2016 Active 
Mein Schiff 6  2,534 2017 June 2017 Active 
Mein Schiff 1 (new) 2,894 2018 May 2018 Active 
Mein Schiff  1,912 1997 January 2019 Active 
Mein Schiff 2 (new) 2,894 2019 February 2019 Active 
Mein Schiff 7 2,894 - 2023 In planning 
Mein Schiff 8 ~ 4,000 - 2024 In planning 






Marella Celebration 1,262 1984 November 2004 Active 
Marella Dream 1,533 1986 April 2010 Active 
Marella Discovery 1,830 1996 Spring 2016 Active 
Marella Discovery 2 1,836 1997 May 2017 Active 
Marella Explorer  1,924 1996 May 2018 Active 




MS Bremen* 155 1990 October 1993 Active 
MS Europa 400 1999 September 1999 Active 
MS Europa 2 500 2012 May 2013 Active 
Hanseatic nature 199 - 230 2019 May 2019 Active 
Hanseatic inspiration 199 - 230 2019 October 2019 Active 





Exhibit 15 – Development of TUI AG’s adjusted EBITDA in the cruise sector153  
 
 










This case analyses the transformation of the tourism group TUI AG from a traditional tour 
operator to a fully vertically integrated holiday provider from 2013 onwards.  
 
The introduction part paints a picture of the threats and challenges which TUI AG was facing 
when the protagonist CEO Friedrich Joussen decided on the new transformative strategy called 
oneTUI. The first part of the case focuses on the tourism industry with its major challenges and 
players. The second part zooms in on the TUI AG by explaining the mingled company history, 
the transformational initiative oneTUI of 2013, and the group portfolio. The last part of the case 
not only analyses future traveller trends but also how an exogenous shock – the coronavirus – 
has brought tourism to a halt. The worldwide travel restrictions have far-reaching, existence-
threatening consequences not only for TUI but also for competitors in the industry.  
 
5.2 Teaching objectives 
 
The teaching case was designed to be taught to both undergraduate and graduate students in the 
fields of strategic management, particularly for classes on Strategic Change and Corporate 
Strategies. The main objective of this case is to present students a real example of a management 
problem with the following teaching objectives: 
 
❖ Introduce the students to a large, incumbent firm and its ability to successfully adapt to 
new market conditions 
❖ Understand the importance of constantly detecting shifts in the environment and of 
reacting to them accordingly by making timely, market-oriented decisions and also by 
changing the resource base to stay competitive (Concept of DC) 
❖ Understand how the corporate strategy of vertical integration can impact a firm’s 
business model 





5.3 Intended contribution 
 
The case’s focal contribution is to showcase an incumbent company’s ability to perform a 
strategic change in order to adapt to the changing environment, in particular to a changing 
customer demand mainly due to digitalization. Specifically, tour operators like TUI had to 
become creative to respond to the fact that travellers were increasingly booking via online travel 
agencies or independently, thereby destroying the business for traditional tour operators. Thus, 
the case intends to draw a thorough picture of which extent the company was able to make use 
of DC to remain competitive in the tourism industry. TUI’s strategic initiative oneTUI was 
aiming at achieving full vertical integration by investing in assets with a clear focus on leisure 
tourism. Therefore, the case demonstrates that the corporate strategy of vertical integration can 
help a company to reach competitive advantage by using synergies along the holiday value 
chain and by engaging in the whole customer journey. Ultimately, the case was framed to allow 
students to understand and critically analyze the motivation and implementation of strategic 
change, which reconfigured the business model.  
 
5.4 Pedagogical overview 
 
To be able to thoroughly understand and discuss the case, the instructor and students should 
review the concept of DC. It is recommended to read the article “Dynamic Capabilities: A 
Review of Past Research and an Agenda for the Future” (Ilídio Barreto, 2010, Journal of 
Management), which covers the definition, the four main dimensions as well as the appropriate 
application of the DC concept. Furthermore, students need to be familiar with the concepts of 
corporate strategies and vertical integration. 
 
Additionally, the instructor and students should visit TUI’s online travel agency websites (e.g. 
the UK website or the German website) to fully understand the range of hotel brands, cruises, 
holiday experiences, and other holiday offers. Furthermore, the corporate website should be 
explored, in particular the ‘About TUI Group’ section. To grasp the company’s current situation 
and the protagonist's goals in 2020, it is also recommended to read the speech and presentation 





5.5 Assignment questions and analysis 
 
The following 3 assignments have been designed to be posed by the instructor to connect the 
theoretical strategy concepts to the teaching case, to stimulate critical thinking about TUI’s 
actions and, finally, to reach the pedagogical objectives.  
 
Assignment 1: How did the oneTUI initiative change the way TUI was operating in terms of its 
core business model & markets and organizational structure? 
 
This assignment is designed to make students aware of the fact, that TUI underwent a drastic 








Assignment 2: After carefully reading the case, please analyze the advantages and 
disadvantages of TUI’s corporate strategy of vertical integration. 
 
The oneTUI initiative led the company into full vertical integration: through the merger of TUI 
Travel and TUI AG in December 2014, the final vertical integration was achieved by combining 
the tour operator side with the ‘content’ side. The growth strategy of TUI’s hotel, cruise, and 
destination experience portfolio further extends the vertical integration, since it shifts the focus 
from the tour operator business to the holiday experiences business. It should be noted here that 
TUI is pursuing the vertical integration strategy in the form of taper integration, meaning that 









Assignment 3: Please analyze TUI's strategic initiatives since 2013 using Barreto’s four 
dimensions of DC. Justify your answer with examples taken from the case. 
 
In this assignment, students are asked to deploy Barreto’s 4 dimensions of DC to analyze the 

















DC Dimensions DC Evaluation 
(1) Propensity to sense opportunities and threats High 
(2) Propensity to make timely decisions Medium 
(3) Propensity to make market-oriented decisions High 
(4) Propensity to change the resource base High 





5.6 Board plan 
 
The schedule of the activities for a 90-minute lecture is the following:  
 
  
Activity Duration (min) 
Literature Review & Teaching Case Review 15 
Assignment 1 20 
Assignment 2 25 
Assignment 3 25 







This dissertation focuses on the strategic change of TUI and utilizes the corporate strategy of 
vertical integration and the concept of DC to support the line of argumentation.  
 
The TUI AG has been chosen as an object of study because it exemplifies the strategic change 
of a large, incumbent company. Its shift from a traditional tour operator to a vertically integrated 
provider of holiday experiences was mainly driven by the digitalization of the tourism industry 
and its customers. As customers were increasingly booking their holidays with online providers 
or independently, the classical tour operator business with its large network of (offline) travel 
agencies became significantly less crucial in the holiday booking process.  
 
The transformational change process affected all parts of the group, most importantly regarding 
its core business model and markets as well as its organizational structure, which is in line with 
the definition of Pettigrew (1987). The transformation of the oneTUI initiative was defined to 
run from 2013 to 2016 but keeps evolving and inspiring the strategic moves of the years 
thereafter. It shows, that the strategic change in this case can be seen as a process rather than a 
rapid, revolutionary change (Burnes, 1996; Orlikowski, 1996; Tsoukas & Chia, 2002). 
 
The TUI case presents the transformation into full vertical integration with its advantages and 
disadvantages. On the bright side, TUI was able to successfully realign its business model and 
was able to generate substantial growth through its assets, which contributed to around 70% of 
its EBITA. The remaining 30% were attributable to the tour operator business and its airlines. 
Thomas Cook, which used to be one of its largest competitors in the European package holiday 
market, had not been able to sense this threat of digitalization to its business model and went 
bankrupt, not only but also due to this shift in the environment. On the downside, a global crisis 
like the corona pandemic would highlight the asset-heavy strategy of TUI and respective 
financial losses and risks in line with the competitive dangers emphasized by Harrigan (1985). 
As the industry was facing immense pressure from online providers and demand suffered from 
the corona pandemic, the vertical integration strategy by TUI appeared to be rather harmful to 
the overall financial situation. The motives for TUI’s vertical integration are aligned with the 
ones supported by Harrigan (1984) and Grant (2016). Synergies from the merger with TUI 




Furthermore, the end-to-end customer service is a successful differentiator towards competitors 
and a lucrative means to cross- and upsell services. In line with the findings of Argyres (1996), 
TUI vertically integrated into activities, in which it already had great organizational skills and 
in which the knowledge base was similar. Since TUI was an experienced tour operator, running 
its own hotels, cruises and destination experiences was a logical step. In fact, the case of TUI 
showcases an example of taper integration and the success of TUI in recent years supports the 
line of argumentation by Rothaermel et al. (2006): the simultaneous vertical integration and 
strategic outsourcing help to enrich the company’s portfolio and the success of the products, 
which would lead to competitive advantage and increase firm performance as a whole. While 
TUI became a fully vertically integrated company and covered the whole value chain of a 
holiday experience, it was still relying on sourcing activities externally via market transactions. 
Upstream, TUI invested in hotels via the ownership model or a joint venture, when it detected 
high profitability, i.e. in growth regions with a scarce supply of hotels. Other hotel investments, 
however, were conducted under other financing structures, such as management, lease and 
franchise contracts or commercial cooperation. In addition, the tour operator business of TUI 
also sells holiday packages including third-party sourced hotel beds and flight seats. The same 
balance of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing could be observed in the cruise 
segment. While the largest cruise brand, TUI Cruises, was run as a joint venture with Royal 
Caribbean, Marella Cruises’ and Hapag-Lloyd’s ships were partly owned and partly leased via 
operating lease or finance lease contracts. Regarding the Destination Experiences segment, TUI 
had made strategic acquisitions to internalize skills, knowledge and customers of those target 
companies, such as Musement. At the same time, TUI build up a two-sided open platform for 
its experience offers, which did not only offer its own experiences but also from third party 
distribution partners. In this way, TUI was not only dependent on its own activities in-house, 
but also on third party contracts and other forms of strategic cooperation. Downstream, TUI 
had its own distribution channels, in terms of travel agencies and online platforms. However, 
TUI holiday package were also sold via franchise travel agencies and independent third-party 
agencies. The major cooperation with Chinese provider Ctrip in the destination experiences 
segment unveiled another opportunity to increase its visibility and attract customer. Rothaermel 
et al. (2006) summarized that the appropriate balance of taper integration in accordance with 
the firm’s resources and its competitive environment can be considered a DC.  
 
The scientific research about DC has been triggered by Teece et al. (1997) and extensively 




which are used in this case to analyze TUI’s ability to adapt to changing environments in an 
appropriate manner. This concept is superior to other concepts as the SWOT analysis. The latter 
statically portrays four dimensions, which are interpreted in a mostly subjective way. As it 
analyzes the situation in a certain point of time, it cannot capture that digitalization for TUI 
could either considered a threat in the beginning, as online providers were conquering the 
market and took away market share, or as an opportunity later on, as a chance to enhance its 
whole business model by providing an app or by offering more individualized packages for its 
customers. The DC approach focuses more on concrete actions taken by the company to react 
to fast-changing exogenous factors. In a rapidly changing world of tourism, which is influenced 
by geopolitical crises like the Brexit or supply shortages and regulatory issues like the Boeing 
737 MAX grounding, it is crucial to adapt in order to achieve new forms of competitive 
advantage. According to the analysis, TUI proved to possess DC and was able to sense and 
react to these threats accordingly, as highlighted by Barreto (2010). Through its differentiated 
portfolio of hotels, cruises, and destination experiences and its new approach to tap into new 
source markets, the tourism group diversifies in two different parts of the tourism value chain. 
Besides, the occupancy risk of hotels could be minimized by its strong marketing and sales 
channels with a large customer base. However, the corona pandemic was a worldwide crisis, 
which no one could have anticipated in its far-reaching consequences and duration. It put the 
TUI AG at an enormous, substantial financial risk. It remains debatable if the TUI AG will use 
the state loan in the right way to survive the crisis. At this moment in time, it was still unsure 
whether the management will take the measures to lead the company into a position to repay 
its debts in the future.  
 
In conclusion, the tourism group was performing a successful shift with its oneTUI initiative 
and was on a good way with its next transformation to become a digital platform company by 
2022, which was one of the largest transformations in company history. The global shock of 
the corona pandemic, however, was unprecedented in its form. Until 2020, TUI had been well 
prepared to adapt to the environment due to its transformation to a taper integrated company 
and its ability to use DC. But what proved to be a successful solution at one point in time, may 
not ensure profitability in another point in time: the heavy investment in assets since 2013 
turned out to be counterproductive for the overall financial situation in 2020. Costs were 
induced by the maintenance of hotels and cruises and loan instalments, as well as employees’ 
wages, had to be paid. Despite all the negative consequences though, the pandemic could also 




even faster as planned. Overhead costs were planned to be cut by 30%, mainly through layoffs. 
It was not stated, how many layoffs the TUI 2022 would have induced, but it can be assumed 
that layoffs would have been necessary anyway due to increased digitalization. After all, the 
basis for business was still strong: the demand was fundamentally existent, only interrupted, or 
shifted to another season. As of May 2020, TUI took reasonable measures to mitigate the effects 
of the crisis.  
 
As for the limitations of the dissertation, TUI AG is a tourism group like no other, and the 
applicability of its measures and strategic initiatives is constrained. The company’s history goes 
way back and a lot of internal processes, high brand awareness, or source markets have grown 
historically. The solutions to business problems presented in this case may not apply to other 
companies in the same industry since TUI is a unique big player in the market. Nevertheless, 
the case showcases a smart way of realigning a company towards a clear purpose, i.e. leisure 
tourism, and can serve as an example for other companies and practices could be transferred. 
Also, the oneTUI initiative seemed to be successful in the short-run, but long-run effects are 
yet to be discovered, as strategic change and fit are defined as ongoing processes. While 
secondary data, in the form of financial data from the annual reports, display positive results of 
the initiative, primary data were not used in this case study. A major factor in the overall 
equation may become the increasing awareness and concerns for environmental issues. Due to 
movements, like ’Fridays for future’, the pollution attributed to aircraft and cruise ships were 
thematized in society. Thus, environmentally friendly travel solutions may be preferred in the 
long run. In this sense, customer preferences and behaviour will have to be monitored closely 
to adapt accordingly.  
 
In general, extensive data collection and field research can further measure the impact of the 
corona pandemic, especially in the tourism industry. In addition, future studies could explore 
the effects of the coronavirus on the future travel behaviour of tourists and study if the demand 
shifted, for example, more towards domestic tourism or towards certain destinations, that were 
considered safer than others. Concerning TUI specifically, the coronavirus interrupted the 
second strategic initiative and it would be an interesting topic to research whether it impeded 
or accelerated the process of change. Future research could also be directed at the new GDN-
OTA platform and its success factors, since the online provider market was already occupied 





7 Conclusion  
 
The theoretical groundwork for this dissertation was the corporate strategy of vertical 
integration and DC. Vertical integration as a corporate strategy has been a much-discussed topic 
in the literature and advantages and disadvantages have to be evaluated on a case to case basis. 
The clear advantage for TUI was to serve and support customers along the whole customer 
holiday journey. However, external factors as the corona pandemic have contributed to manifest 
the downsides of this corporate strategy as well. The concept of DC appears to be the most 
appropriate concept to grasp a company’s ability to adapt to a rapidly changing environment at 
the present state of strategy research. The tourism industry has been torn by many structural 
shocks, including geopolitical crises, the Boeing 737 MAX grounding, or most recently the 
corona pandemic. Besides, costumers’ booking preferences for holidays have changed 
drastically through digitalization and travellers increasingly desire more authentic experiences. 
My dissertation “The case of TUI – Sailing into a bright future or sinking like Thomas Cook?” 
showcases a real-life example of the successful application of the given concepts. I have chosen 
to examine the specific actions as of 2013: it was the time when the new CEO Mr Joussen 
appeared as an agent of change, who was able to refurbish the whole company and initiate a 
strategic change. Back then, the core business of TUI Group was organizing and selling package 
holidays. Since this business was being threatened by online travel agencies, which started to 
combine hotel and flight offerings in dynamic packages, TUI strategically moved into a fully 
integrated provider of holiday experiences. Thomas Cook, which used to be TUI’s main 
competitor in Europe, failed to understand major shifts in the market and went bankrupt, which 
led to further consolidation of the tour operator market. The thesis showcases how vertical 
integration was used as a means to extend TUI’s resource base in the given context. TUI’s 
strategic shift proved to be successful and the Holiday Experiences segment contributed 70% 
to the group’s EBITA in 2019. It is yet unclear, however, which consequences the corona 
pandemic will have on future traveller behaviour and the business of TUI AG.   
 
On a personal note, I learned a lot about the tourism industry and the TUI Group. Also, I 
deepened my knowledge of DC. In particular, I learned how the four dimensions are intertwined 
and only provide success, when a company manages to detect opportunities and threats from 
the rapidly changing environment and modifies its resource base in a purposeful, market-
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